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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
C. ROBERT DUNFIELD and 
LYNN S. DUNFIELD, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiff-Appellant, International 
Resources, for an alleged breach of a lease agreement by Defendant-
Respondent, c. Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. Dunfield, counterclaimed 
alleging that there was indeed a breach of contract on a lease 
agreement but that said breach was Plaintiff-Appellant's fault. 
Both parties are claiming monies due for damage under the lease 
agreement. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, granted Defenda~:· 
Respondent, C. Robert Dunfield and Lynn s. Dunfield's Motion 
to Dismiss. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests this 
Court to uphold and affirm the decision of Judge David B. Du 
granting Defendant-Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS' 
On June 12th, 1975, Snellen M. Johnson filed a com· 
plaint against C. Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. Dunfield. The 
complaint was over a lease entered into on November 4, 1973, 
between International Resources and C. Robert Dunfield and LT 
S. Dunfield, over property located at 4 7 51 Holladay Boulevar: 
* Salt Lake City, Utah. (lR-p.2) The Plaintiffs alleged th~ 
Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. Dunfield at no time prepared the 
*Reference to Case number 228490 is designated by (lR-p ) ar.c 
reference to Case number 244950 is designated by (2R-p ) 
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building for occupancy as agreed and thus did breach and violate 
the lease agreement by which International Resources is entitled 
to the return of its payment of $6,647.10. (lR-p.3) A trial was hel 
after Plaintiff rested, Judge Croft granted Defendant-Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss. (lR-p.22) 
On September 16, 1977, International Resources filed 
a complaint against C. Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. Dunfield. The 
complaint was almost word for word the same as the first complaint 
filed by Snellen M. Johnson. It was over the same lease agreement, 
concerning the same parti~s, and the same issues. (lR-p.2-3, 2R-p2-3 
I? the second complain~, it was alleged the same as the first 
that "C. Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. Dunfield at no time prepared 
the building for occupancy as agreed and thus did breach and vio-
late the lease agreement by which International Resources is 
entitled to the return of its payment of $6,647.10. (2R-p.3) 
Defendant-Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint which the 
Honorable David B. Dee granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A JUDGMENT OF A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION 
RENDERING A DECISION UPON A PARTICULAR ISSUE IS 
CONCLUSIVE A.ND BARS SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION ON THE 
SAME ISSUE. 
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There is a well settled doctrine in the legal com-
munity called the doctrine of "res judicada". Simply stated,. 
the doctrine of res judicada means that a judgment of a court 
of competent jurisdiction directly rendered upon a particular 
issue or issues is conclusive as to the parties and issue ~ 
decided in the same or any other controversy. Once Judge 
Bryant H. Croft, a Judge of competent jurisdiction, ruled in 
favor of Defendant-Respondent dismissing an action by Plainti: 
Appellant over a lease agreement on real property, subsequent 
actions on the same lease concerning the same issues would be 
barred because of the doctrine of "res judicada". 
The defendant respectfully points out to the court 
that all issues alleged in the present legal suit by Inter-
national Resources, have been adjudicated by the Third Judicia: 
District Court. A careful scrutiny of the first complaint 
filed by Mr. Pace, Snellen M. Johnson vs. C. Robert Dunfield a: 
Lynn s. Dunfield, civil No. 228490 and then the second comp~t 
International Resources vs. C. Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. 
Dunfield, civil No. 244950 clearly points out that the only 
issue in both actions is a payment of $6,647.10 received bytf.: 
defendants for a lease on property at 4 751 Holladay Boulevarc, I 
Salt Lake City, Utah. It is interesting to note that in both 
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complaints the amount of money is exactly the same, the address 
is exactly the same, the date of the lease agreement is exactly 
the same, and the parties entering into a lease agreement are 
exactly the same. Coupling all these items that are exactly 
the same in both complaints, there should be no question in 
anyone's mind that the issues of the suit or the cause of action, 
or whatever legal term you would want to put it under, leads 
you to exactly the same conclusion; the actions are identical. 
There is only one minor difference, International Resources 
filed suit the first and Snellen N. Johnson filed suit second. 
In 50 Corpus Juris Sucondum, Sec. 712: 
"A judgment rendered by a court having juris-
diction of the parties and subject matter is 
conclusive and indisputable evidence as to all 
rights, questions, or facts put in issue in the 
suit and actually adjudicated therein, when the 
same come again into controversy between the 
same parties or their privies, even though, 
according to the decisions of the question, the 
subsequent proceedings are on a different cause 
of action since the law abhors a multiplicity of 
suits. Another statement of the rule is that 
any right, fact, or matter is issue, or directly 
adjudicated on, or necessarily involved in, the 
determination of an action before a competent 
court in which a judgment or decree is rendered 
on the merits is conclusively settled by the 
judgment therein and canno~ ~gain be litigated 
between the parties and privies whet~er or not 
the claim or demand, purpose, or subJect matter 
of the two suits is the same." (.er.iphasis added) 
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There are numerous cases which also indicate the same doctrb 
In Runyan v. City of Henryetta, Oklahoma, 321 P2d 689 (1967) 
it states: 
"Doctrine of res judicada is that a final judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdiction upon a 
matter properly before it concludes parties to 
the litigation and their privies, and consti-
tutes a bar to a new action or suit upon the 
same cause of action, either before the same or 
any tribunal." 
The Arizona Supreme Court has also indicated that the doct6 
of res judicada applies to parties and their privies. In Hof' 
v. City of Mesa, 86 Arizona 259, 344 P2d 1013 (1965) it state: 
"Doctrine of res judicada is that existing final 
judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud 
or pollution, by court of competent jurisdiction, 
is conclusive as to every point decided therein 
and also as to every point raised by record which 
could have been decided, with respect to parties 
and privies, in all other actions in same or in 
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent juris-
diction." 
Utah, in a decision written by the Honorable Leste: 
A. Wade, and concurred in by the other four Supreme Court 
Justices, upheld and supported the doctrine of res j udicada i: 
the Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., case 6 UT2d 51, 305 P2d 5~: 
(1957). In part Judge Wade stated: 
"What interest the Flat Top Mining Co. has in 
these claims was derived from the Plaintiffs 
in that action. As stated in 30 Am. Jur. 90, 
Sec 178, on judgments: 
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It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence 
that material facts or questions which were in 
issue in a former action, and were there admitted 
or judicia~ly determined, are conclusively set--
tled by a Judgment rendered therein, and that 
such facts or questions become res judicada and 
may not again be litigated in a subsequent action 
between the same parties or their privies, regard-
less of the form the issue may take in the sub-
sequent action, ...• " pg. 55 
It is clear from the facts in this case that the second 
suit by International Resources is a direct copy of the first 
suit. The cause of action is the same, the items prayed for are 
the same, the defendants are the same, and the only distinction 
is the fact that the Plaintiff is not the same. The legal merit 
to a cause of action on that certain lease dated November 29, 
1973, at 4751 Holladay Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah, has 
been fully litigated and a judgment rendered. Thus, based on 
the doctrine of res judicada, defendant respectfully submits 
that the supreme Court should support Judge Dee in dismissing 
a second legal action. 
POINT II. 
SNELLEN M. JOHNSON AND INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES INC. 
WERE I IN FACT I IN PRIVY. 
Appellant makes a specific point to observe that res 
judicada does not apply to strangers (appellant's brief pg. 5) 
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and that there is no evidence in the record supporting any ti: 
of pr i vi ty between the Plain tiff, International Resources 1• 
' ..... 
and Snellen M. Johnson. (appellant's brief pg. 7) Responden: 
would respectfully dispute these claims by Appellant and subi; 
that Snellen M. Johnson and International Resources Inc. were, 
in fact, closely related in interests and knowledge of each 
other, especially concerning the legal actions discussed here: 
and, further, by legal definition were, in fact, in privity. 
The original lease of the property at 4751 Holladay 
Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah, dated November 29, 1973, was 
between International Resources Inc. and the ounfields. Howe: 
it is interesting to note who signed the agreement on beh~f 
of International Resources, Inc.; Snellen M. Johnson. Note 
also, according to the lease, what his official capacity ~t 
corporation was at that time; President. Also of interest i; 
the Guarantee, attached to the lease, which guarantees paymen: 
the lease by American Ranch and Recreation Company, Inc· Aga: 
Snellen M. johnson' s signature appears as President of Americ: 
Ranch and Recreation. Respondent respectfully submits it is 
beyond imagination that International Resources, with Snellen 
M. Johnson as president, and Snellen M. Johnson, were strange: 
and ~naware of the legal proceedings taking place on the lYP 
in question. 
--
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Second, respondent submits Snellen M. Johnson was 
privy to International Resources, Inc. according to case law 
defining privy. In the first legal action, it is alleged that 
International Resources Inc. has original rights to the lawsuit, 
but then assigned those rights to Snellen M. Johnson. In the 
second lawsuit, it is alleged that Snellen M. Johnson assigned 
his rights back to International Resources. Case law makes 
it clear that a person who obtains rights by purchase or sue-
cession is in privy with the party he obtained the rights from. 
In Paradise Palms Community Association v. Paradise 
Homes, 89 Nev.27, 505 P2d 596, (1973) it states: 
"A privy within general rule that plea of 
res judicada is available only when there 
is privity is one who, after rendition of 
judgment, has acquired an interest in the 
subject matter affected by judgment through 
one of parties, as by inheritance, succession, 
or purchase." See also Bailey v Beekman, In_d. 
App. 362 NE2d 1171 (1977) . (emphasis added) 
The interest or rights of this law suit was first 
assigned to Snellen M. Johnson, who lost the case in District 
Court. subsequent thereto, those rights were assigned back 
to International Resources, Inc., - clearly someone who acquired 
· Based on case law, as quoted above, the rights by succession. 
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Snellen M. Johnson and International Resources, Inc. are~ 
privy. 
POINT III. 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE 
AND BARS RELITIGATION OF AN ISSUE PREVIOUSLY TRIED. 
Even if the court did not feel the doctrine of res 
judicada per se should prohibit the continuation of this su!.:, 
there is another doctrine closely related to res judicada, sc: 
time confused and identified with res j udicada. It is callee 
collateral estoppel. Res judicada bar_s reli tigat:_ion of the 
same cause of action between the same parties or their privk 
where there is a prior judgment, whereas collateral estoppel 
bars relitigation of a particular issue for a determinative 
fact. Thus, the only necessary ingredient to prohibit a secor. 
suit under the doctrine of collateral estoppel is that the sa:: 
cause of action is being tried on the second suit. The reaso:.' 
for the doctrine are obvious, that is, to equitably protecta 
person from being tried twice for the same cause of action ani 
also to protect the courts from subsequent litigation on a 
single issue. 
In the present case, it is clear from the pleadings 
in both matters that the complaints are on the same cause of 
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action. In Richard v. Hodsen, 26 Utah 2nd 113, 485 P2d 1044 
(1971) the Utah Supreme Court used the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. In that particular case, the issues concerning an 
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase agreement had been 
tried, but subsequent thereto another party filed action against 
the same defendants alleging that there was money due under 
the earnest money agreement and offer to purchase. The matter 
was tried and eventually taken to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
The Supreme Court looked at the issues and stated as follows: 
"A form of res judicada applies to situations like 
this wherein issues which are actually decided 
against a party in a prior action, may be relied 
upon by an opponent in a latter case as having 
been judically established. This doctrine, known 
as collateral estoppel, differs from res judicada 
not only in the fact that all parties need not be 
the same in the two actions, but also in the fact 
that the estoppel applies only to issues actually 
litigated and not to those which could have been 
determined. The trend of recent cases is to approve 
this doctrine." 
The Supreme Court of Utah makes it abundantly clear 
that once an issue is litigated by a competent court, the issue 
does not need, nor can it be, retried. On the 25th day of August, 
1976, before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, the issues concerning 
the lease agreement between International resources and C. Robert 
ounfield and Lynn s. ounfield, which was entered into on the 
4th day of November, 1973, were heard. It is apparent from 
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the order of dismissal that evidence was presented on behalf~ 
the plaintiff, that oral arguments were heard by both parties,' 
and that then the complaint was dismissed by the Judge with 
prejudice from the defendants. International Resources and 
their claim against C. Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. Dunfield 
have had their day in court. The Court has spoken and the 
matter is settled. It would be nothing but unjust and unfai: 
to force C. Robert Dunfield and Lynn S. Dunfield to court 
again to try exactly the same issues and same matters that we:: 
heard by this Court on a prior occasion. Based on the doctri:, 
of collateral estoppel, Respondent's attorney respectfully re· 
quests that the case be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
The Judgment of the lower court was in accordance 
with well recognized principles of law and should be upheld. ' 
Respectfully su1:;2mitted / I 
/ 
,,- / 1 
/} ~/i /, / /' /i \..___.,, / , ~/,,_, I 
~ s_tey'en C. Vanderlinden d ·I 
Attorney for Defendants-Respon e. 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
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Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, postage prepaid this ~~day 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
